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Logic in Buddhist Philosophy concerns the systematic study of anuma¯na (often trans-
lated as inference) as developed by Digna¯ga (480-540 c.e.) and Dharmakı¯ti (600-660 c.e.).
Buddhist logicians think of inference as an instrument of knowledge (prama¯n. a) and, thus,
logic is considered to constitute part of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition. Accord-
ing to the prevalent 20th and early 21st century ‘Western’ conception of logic, however,
logical study is the formal study of arguments. If we understand the nature of logic to be
formal, it is difficult to see what bearing logic has on knowledge. In this paper, by weaving
together the main threads of thought that are salient in Digna¯ga’s and Dharmakı¯ti’s texts,
I shall re-conceive the nature of logic in the context of epistemology and demarcate the
logical part of epistemology which can be recognised as logic. I shall demonstrate that we
can recognise the logical significance of inference as understood by Buddhist logicians
despite the fact that its logical significance lies within the context of knowledge.
1 Logic in Buddhist Philosophy
Logic in Buddhist Philosophy, as we understand it in this chapter, concerns the
systematic study of anuma¯na (often translated as inference) as developed by
Digna¯ga (480-540 c.e.) and Dharmakı¯ti (600-660 c.e.). Buddhist logicians think
of inference as an instrument of knowledge (prama¯n. a) and, thus, logic is consid-
ered to constitute part of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition. The focus of
1Many thanks go to Parimal Patil and Tom Tillemans for their extensive comments on an earlier
version of this chapter.
this chapter is on the tradition of Buddhist philosophy called prama¯n. ava¯da which
is concerned mainly with epistemology and logic. Thus, we are not concerned
with various reasoning patterns that can be discerned in the writings of Bud-
dhist philosophers; for example, when the Ma¯dhyamika philosopher Na¯ga¯rjuna
presents an argument in terms of catus. kot.i (four ‘corners’: true, false, both, nei-
ther).2 Nor are we concerned with lists of ‘rules’ for debates, such as the ones
contained in the Indian va¯da (debate) literature and Tibetan bsdus grwa, though
debates are important aspects of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist intellectual life.3
This chapter contains a discussion of the philosophy of logic that is at-
tributable to Buddhist logicians. I will attempt to make sense of the Bud-
dhist conception of the nature of logic by weaving together the main treads
of thought that are salient in Digna¯ga’s Prama¯n. asamuccaya (and his auto-
commentary Prama¯n. asamuccayavr. tti) and Dharmakı¯rti’s Prama¯n. avinis´caya and
Prama¯n. ava¯rttika. The exegetical studies of these texts and other texts recognised
as belonging to the prama¯n. ava¯da tradition are extensive but not exhaustive. The
collection of historical data and the close reading of these texts are important
tasks. In this chapter, however, we step back from the texts and examine (or re-
examine) what ‘inference’ or ‘logic’ might mean for Buddhist logicians.4 I will
sketch the Buddhist conception of the nature of logic by uncovering some of the
presuppositions that underly the thoughts expressed in Buddhist logic texts.
2 The Role of Inference in Epistemology
Epistemology in the Buddhist philosophical tradition is generally concerned with
instruments or sources of knowledge. What we know is considered to depend
on how we know. That is, what we are warranted to be aware of depends on
how we come to be aware of it. So, in order to understand what we know, Bud-
dhist philosophers investigate the sources which give rise to warranted awareness
(prama¯).
Buddhist logicians identify two sources of knowledge: perception (pratyaks. a)
and inference (anuma¯na). Perception is said to be an immediate contact with
particulars without any mediation of conception (which is considered to involve
universals). There are two standard examples used to illustrate inference. In one
2There is a large number of secondary literature written about catus. kot.i. See, for example,
Robinson (1957) and Ruegg (1977). For treatments of catus. kot.i using contemporary logical ma-
chinery, see Garfield and Priest (2003), Priest (2010), Tillemans (1999) ch. 9 and Tillemans (2009).
3For a discussion of bsdus grwa logic, see Tillemans (1999) ch. 6.
4For studies of Digna¯ga’s works, see, for example, Hattori (1968) and Hayes (1988). For book-
length studies of Dharmakı¯rti’s works, see, for example, Dreyfus (1997) and Dunne (2004). For
brief accounts of Dharmakı¯rti’s life and works, see Steikellner (1998) and Tillemans (2011). See
also Gillon (2011) for a brief discussion of Buddhist logic in a larger historical context.
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standard example, when we are aware that there is smoke on a mountain, we
may infer that there is fire on that mountain. When we become aware of the
presence of fire on the mountain in this way, that awareness is said to be warranted
by inference and, thus, it counts as knowledge. In another example, we may
become aware of the presence of a tree by inferring from our awareness that there
is rosewood (s´im. s´apa¯). Such awareness of the presence of a tree that is brought
about by inferential cognition is said to be warranted and, thus, it is ascribed the
status of knowledge.
Digna¯ga explains that the purpose of his texts — the foundational texts for the
Buddhist epistemological and logical tradition — is to refute his opponents’ views
on the instruments of knowledge as well as to establish his own view as correct.5
Once inference is shown to be an instrument of knowledge, it is also shown to
serve as an instrument for producing a cognition that can be ascribed the status
of knowledge. Hence, inference can be thought to result not only in awareness
that inference is an instrument of knowledge, but also in awareness of the truths
of Buddhist thought.
Buddhist logicians recognise two contexts in which inference can be used as
an instrument of knowledge. On the one hand, it can be used as an instrument for
becoming aware of soteriological truths, such as the four noble truths, by them-
selves. This is called ‘inference for oneself’ (sva¯rtha¯numa¯na). On the other hand,
inference can be used as an instrument in dialectical engagements with opponents.
In this context, inference serves as a tool for showing that the opponents’ views
are mistaken and to demonstrate that Buddhists’ own views are correct in dialectic
practice. This is called ‘inference for others’ (para¯rtha¯numa¯na). Thus, inference
has a function directed at oneself and a function directed at others.6
3 Logic or Epistemology?
If we understand inference as a source of knowledge, it must be assumed that a
certain relationship holds between inference and knowledge. In particular, it must
be assumed that inference has a direct impact on one’s knowledge state. As is im-
plicit in the standard examples, inference subsumes three elements which might
be thought to be distinct. One element of inference in the standard examples is the
awareness of smoke or rosewood. This is the cognitive state prior to the involve-
ment of the inferential cognitive process. The second element is the inferential
cognitive process which moves cognition from awareness of smoke or rosewood
to awareness of fire or tree. The third element is the resulting cognitive state, that
is, awareness of fire or tree. These elements of Buddhist logic may strike some
5See Prama¯n. asamuccayavr. tti 1.10-1.13, translated in Hattori (1968) pp. 23-24.
6See Kellner (2004), Krasser (2001) and Patil (2009) ch. 6.
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as problematic given that ‘inference’ (or logic in general) is often understood as
not having any bearing on knowledge. Some may even consider them to show
that there is no logic in the Buddhist tradition (as we will see below). I will con-
sider this issue before going on to explicate how Buddhist logicians understand
inference in the context of epistemology.
According to the ‘Western’ conception of logic prevalent since the twentieth
century, logical study is the formal study of arguments. An argument consists
of premises and a conclusion (or conclusions). A study of logic is considered to
be a study of the (syntactic) form of the relationship between the premises and a
conclusion. If an argument has the form: A and A ⊃ B (if A then B), therefore
B (modus ponens), for example, then the argument which instantiates this form is
said to be valid. The form that an argument instantiates may also capture a sub-
sentential (sub-propositional) structure. For example, an argument may have the
following form: ∃x∀yRxy (Something Rs everything), therefore ∃xRxx (Some-
thing Rs itself). Any argument which has this (sub-sentential) form is also said to
be valid.
Western logicians disagree about which forms of argument should count as
valid. (Strict) Aristotelian logicians regard the above sub-sentential structure
(first-order structure) invalid as it is not one of the syllogisms that Aristotle identi-
fied. Intuitionistic logicians reject as invalid the form: ¬¬A (it is not the case that
A is not the case), therefore A, as they interpret negation in terms of the failure to
find a proof, and, thus, a failure to find a negative proof doesn’t tantamount to a
success of finding a positive proof. Paraconsistent logicians — whose logics have
recently been applied to the study of reasoning involving catus. kot.i — may regard
modus ponens invalid. If A were both true and false, then A and A ⊃ B would be
true (since A would also be false) while B might be only false.7
Which forms of argument should count as valid is evidently a contentious mat-
ter. Nonetheless, there is one thing that contemporary (western) logicians share
in common — namely, the idea that logic is concerned with the forms of argu-
ments. An argument is said to be valid if it instantiates a valid argument form.
It is important to notice that, for contemporary logicians, the specific contents of
the premises and the conclusion are irrelevant to logical study. The main focus of
logical study is with the mathematical structures that satisfy valid argument forms
rather than a concern with what the argument is about.8
7Paraconsistent logicians reject modus ponens which is formulated in terms of ‘material con-
ditional’ ⊃. A ⊃ B is said to be true if and only if A is false or B is true. Some paraconsistent
logicians introduce different accounts of the conditional, usually relevant conditionals, which val-
idate modus ponens. For an introduction to paraconsistent logics, see, for example, Priest and
Tanaka (2009).
8This ‘orthodox’ conception of logic is, in fact, a combination of the views on the nature of
logic held by several logicians. It was Kant who argued for the view of logic according to which
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If we understand the nature of logic to be formal in this way, it is difficult
to see what bearing logic has on cognitions that result in knowledge. Consider
the following argument: there is smoke on a mountain, and if there is smoke
on a mountain then there is fire on that mountain, therefore there is fire on that
mountain. This argument has the form of modus ponens and, thus, it is formally
valid. Now, assume that we know that there is smoke on the mountain and that
where there is smoke there is fire, but we don’t know that there is fire on the
mountain. It seems that we ought to come to reason so that we know that there is
fire on the mountain. However, what is the role of the validity of modus ponens
in this reasoning? In order to think of modus ponens itself as having an impact
on our cognitive activity, it wouldn’t be sufficient for modus ponens to be, in fact,
valid: we would have to be aware of the validity of modus ponens. We would also
have to be aware that if an argument has a valid form, then we would have to infer
the conclusion of the argument. But, in order to have this awareness, we would
also have to be aware that if we are aware that ‘if an argument has a valid form,
then we have to infer the conclusion of the argument’, then we would have to infer
the conclusion. But, then, we would also have to be aware that ... ad infinitum. It
seems that the form of the argument is not sufficient for thinking that there is fire
on the mountain.9
The difficulty of accounting for the relationship between valid forms of argu-
ments and knowledge can also be illustrated by examining what kind of cognitions
are, in fact, involved in order to acquire new knowledge. We most likely infer that
there is fire on a mountain if we are aware that there is smoke on that mountain and
that where there is smoke there is fire. But, that is because awareness that there
is fire on a mountain is consistent or coherent with what we already know, and
not because cognitive activity involved in inferring that there is fire on a mountain
has the form of modus ponens. When we acquire new knowledge by means of
inferential cognitions, it is not the form of an argument (or reasoning) that forces
us to infer the conclusion but the consistency (or coherency) of what we are aware
of that moves us to cognise in a certain way. Hence, it seems that knowledge of
the validity of an argument form is not even a necessary condition for knowing
that there is fire on a mountain based on what we already know.10
Faced with these difficulties in accounting for the significance of epistemol-
ogy in formal logic, we have (at least) two options in our attempt to understand
logic is abstracted from the objects of cognition. It is this view which became the main stream
in the modern development of logic. See his Lectures on Logic. Translations of some of Kant’s
lectures on logic can be found in Young (1992). However, the account presented here is largely a
model-theoretic account due to Tarski. See, for example, Tarski (1936).
9For the difficulty of this kind, see Carroll (1895), though the point of Carroll’s discussion is
moot.
10For a discussion of this kind, see Harman (1986).
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the role that inference (anuma¯na) is said to play in Buddhist epistemology. One
is to suggest that the study of anuma¯na is not a study of logic at all (and, thus,
it is misleading to translate it as ‘inference’). After all, anuma¯n. a is an instru-
ment for acquiring knowledge and, as such, it is an epistemological, not a formal,
apparatus. Thus, according to this suggestion, there is no logic in Buddhist episte-
mology; there is just epistemology.11 It would follow that, strictly speaking, there
is no Buddhist philosophy of logic.
This is not the only way in which we can respond to the above difficulties,
however. Alternatively, we can re-conceive the nature of logic in the context of
epistemology and demarcate the logical part of epistemology which can be recog-
nised as logic.12 To think of an inference simply as a formal matter is to think
of it as having logical significance independent of the cognitive act which can be
characterised as inferential. If we think that logic is only about argument forms, it
is difficult to understand the impact of inference on cognitive activities. However,
we can understand inference as having logical significance within certain cogni-
tive acts of inferring (or cognition which acts inferentially). Thus, according to
this suggestion, we can focus on the nature of the role that inferential cognition
plays. This is not to say that the form in which such a cognition takes place cannot
be ascertained. It does suggest, however, that the form of a cognition is not what
is at issue for Buddhist logicians.
Which of these two suggestions is most faithful to the Buddhist tradition is
a controversial matter that I shall not attempt to settle in this chapter. If we are
to elucidate Buddhist philosophy of logic, however, we must assume that we can
recognise logic as part of the Buddhist study of anuma¯na (inference). Based on
this (defeasible) assumption, I present what I take to be the conception of logic
assumed by Buddhist logicians. Since logic is conceived in the context of epis-
temology, the Buddhist conception of logic must be unique (at least in compari-
son with twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Western orthodoxy). If so, this
chapter does not merely present the way in which Buddhist logicians understand
the nature of the object of their study, it also makes an important contribution to
the philosophy of logic in general in that it develops an alternative to the concep-
tion of logic as purely formal in nature.13
11See, for example, Siderits (2003).
12I believe that this is the option taken by, for example, Matilal (1998), Mohanty (1992) and
Tillemans (1999).
13In fact, despite the fact that logic is standardly understood to be formal in the sense that it
doesn’t have any bearing on knowledge, a study of the history of logic reveals that epistemologi-
cal considerations often framed the development of logic. See, for example, Macbeth (2005) and
Hylton (2005) for discussions of logical development by Frege and Russell — two of the founding
figures of modern logic — respectively. Generally, the (western) history of logic is much more
complicated than what many scholars of Buddhist logic assume. In fact, it lacks the uniformity
that is often assumed when they appeal to (western) logical apparatus. See, for example, Gold-
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4 The Elements of Inference
Buddhist logicians hold that, by inference, one seeks to establish for oneself or for
others the presence of what is to be proven (sa¯dhya) in a particular locus (paks. a)
on the basis of the presence of an inferential reason (hetu) at that locus. For
example, to use a standard example, when one sees smoke (inferential reason) on
a particular mountain (locus), one may infer that there is fire (what is to be proven)
on that mountain.
For an inference to count as ‘valid’ or an instrument of knowledge, the in-
ferential reason must satisfy the triple conditions (trairu¯pya). There are mainly
two interpretations of these triple conditions: ontological and epistemological.
According to the ontological interpretation (which seems the more common inter-
pretation), they can be presented as follows. (1) What is identified as the inferen-
tial reason must be present in the locus in question. This means, in our example,
that smoke must be present on the mountain in question. This implies that a cog-
niser is, in fact, in a situation where there is smoke on the mountain. The second
and third conditions are called pervasion (vya¯pti). (2) The inferential reason must
be present in at least one similar case (sapaks. a) — a locus where what is to be
proven is present.14 For example, smoke must be present in a kitchen with a
wood-burning stove. (3) The inferential reason must not be present in any dissim-
ilar case (vipaks. a) — a locus where what is to be proven is absent. For example,
smoke must not be present in a misty lake. The reason given for a thesis to be
proven by inference must satisfy these triple conditions to count as an instrument
of warranted awareness (i.e., knowledge).
According to (a strong form of) the epistemic interpretation, the triple con-
ditions can be presented as follows: (1) the inferential reason must be known to
occur in the locus, (2) the inferential reason must be known to occur in a simi-
lar case, and (3) the inferential reason must be known not to occur in dissimilar
cases.15
The difficulty of reconciling the ontological and epistemological interpreta-
tions is due to the epistemic context in which inference must be understood. In
order to properly understand inference in epistemic contexts, we cannot think of
these two interpretations mutually exclusive. According to the ontological in-
barb (1979), MacFarlane (2000) and van Heijenoort (1967).
14This is the formulation of Digna¯ga. Dharmakı¯rti modifies the second condition as: the inferen-
tial reason must be present in at least one similar case and only in similar cases. See Potter (1969).
15The secondary literature on the triple conditions is extensive. See, for example, Franco (1990),
Katsura (1983), Katsura (1984), Oetke (1994a), Patil (2010), Tillemans (1999) ch. 5 as well as sev-
eral papers in Katsura and Steinkellner (2004). The majority of the secondary literature seems to
present ontological interpretations. For epistemological interpretations, see Oetke (1994b) p. 846
and Patil (2009) pp. 66ff.
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terpretation, it is a fact that the triple conditions are satisfied. This fact can be
appealed to as evidence for justifying one’s awareness of the presence of fire on
a mountain, for example. That is, if it can be demonstrated that one’s awareness
of fire can be characterised by the triple conditions, then that awareness, not its
form but its content, can be given the status of knowledge by appealing to the fact
about the satisfaction of triple conditions. This means that the triple conditions
function as the standard of evaluation for what counts as knowledge. If one ac-
cepts this ontological interpretation, however, it is difficult to understand how the
triple conditions have bearing on the acquisition of knowledge. Just as the validity
of an argument form is not sufficient for coming to have knowledge, the fact that
there is a justification doesn’t seem to be enough for one to acquire knowledge.16
If we are to think that the triple conditions serve as a means of knowledge, they
must contain the epistemic fact about one’s having knowledge. Hence, if we are
to understand the role that inference plays in epistemological contexts, we need to
accommodate both intepretations.17
5 Buddhist Conception of Logic
Our discussion in the previous section suggests that inference is both ontological
and epistemoplogical. As an instrument of warranted awareness, inference must
warrants or justifies one’s awareness but must also be instrumental in moving
one’s cognitive state to another cognitive state.
Consider, again, our example of smoke and fire on a mountain. Suppose that
one is in a situation where there is smoke on a particular mountain. In order for
awareness of fire on that mountain to be warranted, smoke must co-occur or must
be co-located with fire on the mountain in the same way that smoke co-occurs with
fire in a kitchen. However, smoke on a mountain must never co-occur with fire in
a misty lake despite the fact that it may look as though there is smoke on the lake
and, thus, there may be a mistaken ‘appearance’ of fire in the lake. Supposedly,
these are the facts about the elements of inference. It may be difficult to establish
that these facts, in fact, obtain. Nonetheless, if they are presented as facts, one
can appeal to them in order to justify the inferential awareness of the presence
16For a discussion of the need for the epistemologisation of the triple conditions, see Tille-
mans (2004).
17One way to reconcile these two interpretations is to think of Buddhist logicians as being inter-
nalists about justification. That is to say that, for Buddhist logicians, the basis for the justification
lies within one’s cognition. This internalist characterisation of Buddhist epistemology is given in
Arnold (2005) ch. 2. I shall put aside this internalist interpretation of Buddhist epistemology. In
this chapter, I attempt to accommodate both ontological and epistemological interpretations with-
out resorting to internalist epistemology. For a discussion of internalist/externalist epistemology
as applied to Buddhists (and Nyaiya¯yikas), see Patil (2009).
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of fire on the mountain based on the awareness of the presence of smoke on that
mountain.
For pervasion between inferential reason and what is to be proven to have any
cognitive grip, however, it has to be expressed to us in an intelligible manner. For
example, I would not be cognitively moved at all by the mere fact that there is
fire where there is smoke, unless that fact places some demand on my cognition.
Nor would my cognition be stimulated to produce awareness of the presence of
fire if I am simply perceiving smoke on a mountain. An immediate, perceptual
awareness of smoke is not, of itself, enough for awareness of the presence of
fire to warrantably occur. In order for cognition to be warranted and a cognitive
process required such that certain awareness is brought about, we must connect the
concept smoke with fire in a cognitively robust relation. By making a conceptual
commitment to invoke fire together with smoke, we can act appropriately in the
presence of fire when we become aware of smoke. The resulting awareness is
dependent upon the warrantable relation of the elements in the inference becoming
cognitively significant.18
The concepts invoked in making a conceptual commitment are not fully formed
independent of their use in cognition. Instead, the contents of concepts are shaped
by the commitment one undertakes through inferential cognition. It is by making
a conceptual commitment that we acquire knowledge. In turn, the triple con-
ditions which hold between the elements of inference become incorporated into
cognition.
As the content of a concept becomes more determinate, it is assumed that one
may come to recognise more robust relations between smoke and fire. The more
one learns about smoke (its chemical constitution, etc.), the better one ascertains
its relation to fire. Of course, there may be a situation where we may have to revise
our commitment about smoke and fire. If one thought that smoke is just something
caused by cooking, for example, then one might have to revise one’s epistemic
commitment so that one would now be aware that smoke is something which is
caused by fire. So an inferential cognition may defeat the inferential cognition
that forms the content of smoke in its premature form (when one wasn’t aware
that smoke is caused by fire and not by cooking as such).19 In this way, as the
content of concepts becomes more determinate through inferential cognitions, one
attains more certainty as well as truth of the matter and, thus, acquires warranted
awareness.
Now, it is true that an inferential cognition requires awareness of triple condi-
tions which can be given a formal treatment:
18The Buddhist theory of concepts and concept formation is what is known as the theory of
apoha. For the most recent study of apoha, see Siderits, Tillemans and Chakrabarti (2011).
19For a discussion of the defeasible nature of triple conditions, see Oetke (1996).
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Inferential reason (hetu) must be (known to be) present in the locus in
question (sapaks. a).
Inferential reason must be (known to be) present in at least one similar
case (sapaks. a).
Inferential reason must not be (known to be) present in any dissimilar
case (vipaks. a).
One can provide mathematical structures that satisfy these triple conditions as a
study of Buddhist ‘logic’.20 They may express the forms that inferential cognition
may take. Nonetheless, for Buddhist logicians, inference is considered to be im-
portant insofar as it shapes the contents of our awareness. That is, the importance
of inference lies not in ascertaining forms of knowledge but in their contribution
to the content of knowledge. It is in this way that we can see an understanding
of the nature of inferential cognition as a crucial aspect of Buddhist epistemol-
ogy as well as the conception of inference (and logic more generally) that can be
attributed to Buddhist logicians.
6 Logic in Buddhist Logic
If we thought that logic was essentially formal, the notions of inference and infer-
ential cognitions must be assumed to come apart in a certain way. An inference
might be said to underwrite the validity of an inferential cognition. Yet it would
not impel one to undergo an inferential cognitive process. According to the for-
mal conception of logic, an inference expresses the fact about the validity of an
inferential cognition, but it doesn’t express the norm by means of which an infer-
ential cognition ought to take place. Thus, under the formal conception of logic,
an inferential cognition must be understood as independent of inferences.
Buddhist logicians, by contrast, don’t think of inferential cognitions as in-
dependent of inferences. An inference expresses an epistemic commitment that
forms the content of a warranted awareness. This means that Buddhist logicians
don’t think of inference as underwriting an inferential cognition. Rather, an infer-
ence is considered to express an epistemic commitment, particularly a conceptual
commitment, that is undertaken in an inferential cognitive process. For Buddhist
logicians, the significance of inference lies within the context of inferential cog-
nitions.
Thus, the Buddhist study of inference (anuma¯na) is not a formal study of argu-
ments. Buddhist logicians are not concerned with abstracting forms of arguments
and studying the (mathematical) properties of these forms. While one might take
20For a book-length study of Buddhist logic in terms of mathematical structures, see Chi (1969).
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this as an evidence for the thought that there is no Buddhist logic, one might alter-
natively attempt to understand the role of inference according to a conception of
logic that does not abstract from the contents of knowledge.21 As I have attempted
to show, we can recognise the logical significance of inference as understood by
Buddhist logicians despite the fact that its logical significance lies within the con-
text of (contentful) cognition.
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